Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi - Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara: A Revived Iraqi Insurgent Brand

Logo of Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara

The name of this group translates to “The Honored City’s Brigades.” Its
origins lie in the days of the Sunni insurgency of the Iraq War, though
it is quite clear that it was an independent group. For example, in this
posting from September 2007,
it is identified as one of the “jihadi groups not rallying under any
front,” contrasting with, most notably, the “Islamic State of Iraq”
umbrella that included al-Qa’ida in Bilad al-Rafidayn. Like the Jaysh
al-Mujahideen, Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara has begun advertising its
military activities more openly on social media with the revival of the
broader Sunni insurgency since the beginning of this year.



According to a media representative for Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara
whom I interviewed, the group “was established after the beginning of
the occupation, and continued fighting
until the occupier left. After the occupier left, it undertook secret
work, and when the battle in Syria began, some of the youth went to
Syria to fight there, and a contingent within Iraq remained to prepare
for the occasion to go to Syria, and after that the battle began in
Iraq.”



To be sure, the media representative’s claims of secrecy post-American
withdrawal in 2011 explain the lack of media material demonstrating a
supposed presence within Syria. A contingent fighting in Syria hardly
comes as a surprise if true. Tying the Iraq and Syria struggles together
is not solely the preserve of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
(ISIS), but also articulated by ISIS’ rivals in Jamaat Ansar al-Islam
(which has ideological affinity with ISIS and has openly deployed a
contingent to Syria), the Islamic Army of Iraq, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen.



However, unlike these aforementioned groups, Saraya al-Madina
al-Munawara does not see itself at odds with ISIS, as indicated to me in
the interview in response to a question I posed on relations with ISIS:
“Our program is the book [i.e. the Qur’an] and the Sunnah. We have no
disagreement with any of the mujahideen. Our aim is the establishment of
justice and a rightly-guiding Caliphate.” At the same time the
representative expressed hopes to me for unity among the insurgent
groups, saying that if such unity were achieved, they could reach
Baghdad “within days.” The testimony thus related points to a clear
Islamist outlook, though the open-source discourse does not place
emphasis on establishing the Caliphate in the manner stressed by ISIS
and Jamaat Ansar al-Islam.



There is no reason here not to accept the claims of good relations with
ISIS. Though I have documented tensions with groups like Jamaat Ansar
al-Islam and Jaysh al-Mujahideen (who, incidentally, have taken
advantage of the chaos ensuing the fall of Mosul to launch a new
coordinated offensive in the Hawija area of Kirkuk), it is apparent that
others are willing to work with ISIS and even hail their efforts.

 ”Jaysh
al-Mujahideen unite with their al-Ansar [i.e. Jamaat Ansar al-Islam]
brothers,” as part of Operation “Kirkuk is being liberated.” 

An instructive case-in-point is the local Mosul franchise for the
General Military Council (GMC), which is a front group for the Ba’athist
Naqshbandi Army (JRTN). With the Mosul branch having previously hailed ISIS as “lions of the desert,” the GMC recently released a statement on the fall of Mosul
in which it claimed that “the rebels of Mosul in all their factions- by
God’s preference- seized complete control of the right side of Mosul
[i.e. the side west of the Tigris River]…and all the political and
security leadership fled.” The GMC also released some photos showing
capture and destruction of Iraqi army equipment in the wider Ninawa
province.

GMC photo claiming captured military equipment in Ninawa province, 10th June

GMC photo claiming seizure of an army Hummer in Ninawa province, 10th June

Though there is good reason to be skeptical of the GMC’s claims to have participated in the takeover of Mosul in light of past stealing credit from ISIS
for new insurgent offensives launched in Anbar province (most notably
in al-Zuba’ and al-Karma, with the record subsequently clarified in
ISIS’ favor here),
two conclusions are to be drawn here: first, neither JRTN nor its front
groups wish to confront ISIS, regardless of true feelings towards ISIS,
and second, other groups are clearly exploiting the vacuum created by
the ISIS-dominated takeovers of new areas in Ninawa, Kirkuk and Salah
ad-Din provinces. 

There is a possibility that the eventual arrangement in Mosul may
parallel Fallujah, where there is sharing of the city between ISIS and
other insurgent groups but as per a virtual agreement on ISIS’ terms, or
parallel to the nebulous co-existence between the Assad regime forces
and the PYD in Qamishli. 

Coming back to Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara, it remains to discuss the
group’s area of operations. According to the media representative I
interviewed, the group does not openly proclaim or advertise many of
their operations, but from what can be gathered from published material,
it would appear the group primarily operates in Anbar (to be more
specific, the wider Fallujah
and Ramadi areas), and like other minor insurgent groups its attacks
are mostly limited to mortar strikes and hit-and-run style operations.
This does not exclude the possibility of their operating in the wider
area.

”Hitting army headquarters in Anbar.” Saraya al-Madina al-Munawara photo

As above

As above

Though dwarfed by the size and capabilities of ISIS, the case of Saraya
al-Madina al-Munawara does illustrate the complexity of intra-insurgent
dynamics going beyond the well-known rivalries such as the tensions
between Jamaat Ansar al-Islam and ISIS, further eroding any government
hopes of making gains against ISIS and the wider insurgency.